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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Jorge A. Mora Elizondo appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty 
plea to felony injury to children.  Elizondo claims the prosecutor breached the 
plea agreement in making her sentencing recommendation and that the district 
court abused its sentencing discretion.    
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
According to the Presentence Report (“PSI”), the facts leading to 
Elizondo’s conviction for felony injury to children are as follows: 
On 01/12/2015 at approximately 1550 hours, Heather Young spoke 
to Officer Robertson, regarding sexual misconduct between her 
 [A.M.] ( ) and Ms [sic] Young’s fiancé, Jorge 
Mora Elizondo ( ). 
 
On 01/13/15, Deputy Uhrig was assigned this case for 
investigation.  [A.M.] stated about a month ago, around Christmas 
break, she was caught by Mr. Elizondo sneaking back into the 
house and he cornered her and “sniffed her vaginal area” and sent 
her to bed.  Then around 0100 hours, he produced a little black 
vibrator and told her to drop her pants.  [A.M.] stated she told Mr. 
Elizondo no but he kept insisting.  She stated she would not do it 
unless she was in the bathroom.  She went into the bathroom and 
dropped her pants.  Mr. Elizondo then opened the door to the 
bathroom.  He had her put the device in her vagina and he 
watched.  [A.M.] explained once the device vibrated, she gave it 
back to Mr. Elizondo, who indicated he was going to take it to work 
with him to “test” if she had sex, telling her that he was going to 
plug it in to his computer at work. 
 
[A.M.] told Detective Uhrig about the night of 01/13/15, when Mr. 
Elizondo wanted to talk to her in his room.  He locked the door.  Mr. 
Elizondo told [A.M.] to sit on the floor and she complied.  He then 
instructed her to lay down and she complied.  Mr. Elizondo got on 
top of her and he held her hands down above her head.  [A.M.] told 
Detective Uhrig she did not want to look at him, as he had a 
psychotic look on his face but he would force her head to look at 
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him.  He began to choke her with his hand and she was starting to 
have trouble breathing.  He eventually got off her and told her to 
follow him into her room.  Mr. Elizondo instructed her to pull out a 
box from underneath her bed.  Inside were marijuana and a 
marijuana pipe.  [A.M.] stated the items did not belong to her but 
Mr. Elizondo said they were hers.  Mr. Elizondo then got back on 
top of her and told her to look at him.  He put his hand on her 
stomach, lifted up her shirt, and began to circle her belly button with 
his finger.  [A.M.] told Detective Uhrig, he moved his hand up under 
her shirt between her breasts.  She stated she was not wearing a 
bra at the time.  She pushed his hand away and told him it was not 
okay.  Mr. Elizondo got off her and left the room.  While Mr. 
Elizondo was on top of [A.M.], she was able to feel that he had an 
erection. 
 
(PSI, pp.2-3.) 
The state charged Elizondo with two counts of sexual battery of a minor 
child sixteen or seventeen years of age and one count of misdemeanor injury to 
a child.  (R., pp.36-38.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Elizondo pled guilty to an 
amended charge of felony injury to a child based on his willfully causing or 
permitting A.M. “to suffer unjustifiable mental suffering . . . by having sexual 
contact with said child[.]”  (R., pp.42-43.)  The state agreed to recommend a 
sentence of local jail and probation, which recommendation was not binding on 
the court.  (R., p.44; Plea Tr., p.15, L.9 – p.16, L.5.)   The district court sentenced 
Elizondo to an underlying sentence of five years with two years fixed and 
retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.51-53.)  Elizondo filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., 
pp.58-60.)     
 
 3 
 
ISSUES 
 
 Elizondo states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the State deprive Mr. Elizondo of his right to due process 
when the State breached the plea agreement by impliedly 
disavowing its promised sentencing recommendation? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. 
Elizondo, following his Alford plea to felony injury to a child? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 4.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Elizondo failed to show the prosecutor’s comments at sentencing 
constituted a breach of the plea agreement? 
 
2. Has Elizondo failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
ordering an underlying sentence of five years with two years fixed and placing 
him in the retained jurisdiction program? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
 
Elizondo Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor’s Comments At Sentencing 
Constituted A Breach Of The Plea Agreement 
 
A. Introduction 
 Elizondo asserts he was deprived “of his right to due process when the 
state breached the plea agreement by impliedly disavowing its promised 
sentencing recommendation.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.5 (capitalization and 
emphasis modified).)  Elizondo’s claim fails.  Elizondo has failed to show the 
prosecutor’s statements at sentencing were improper.       
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Plea agreements are contractual in nature.  State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 
914, 120 P.3d 299, 302 (Ct. App. 2005).  Therefore, as with other types of 
contracts, the interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea 
agreement are matters of law reviewed de novo.  Id.  Likewise, “whether a plea 
agreement has been breached is a question of law to be reviewed by [the 
appellate court] de novo, in accordance with contract law standards.”  State v. 
Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 255, 281 P.3d 90, 92 (2012) (quoting State v. Peterson, 
148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010)); accord State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 
71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005); State v. Schultz, 150 Idaho 97, 99, 244 P.3d 
241, 243 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues, 
including claimed due process violations, is one of deference to factual findings, 
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unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found.  State v. Decker, 152 
Idaho 142, 147, 267 P.3d 729, 734 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 
131, 134, 244 P.3d 630, 633 (Ct. App. 2010).  “It is the defendant’s burden to 
demonstrate facts that constitute a due process violation.”  Decker, 152 Idaho at 
147, 267 P.3d at 734 (citing Jacobson, 150 Idaho at 134, 244 P.3d at 633; State 
v. Cantrell, 139 Idaho 409, 412, 80 P.3d 345, 348 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
 
C. Elizondo Has Failed To Establish The Prosecutor’s Comments At 
Sentencing Were Error 
 
As part of Elizondo’s plea agreement, the state agreed to recommend a 
sentence of local jail and probation, which recommendation was not binding on 
the court.  (R., p.44; Plea Tr., p.15, L.9 – p.16, L.5.)  The prosecutor’s actual 
recommendation was well within those limitations.  The relevant portion of the 
prosecutor’s comments at sentencing reads: 
 In this particular case, there was a pretrial settlement offer 
with a recommendation for local jail time and probation.  As such, 
the State’s recommendations in this case is [sic] for four years fixed 
followed by three years indeterminate for a seven-year unified 
sentence.  We’re asking to place the defendant on four years of 
supervised probation, and we are asking for the Court to impose 
some actual jail time.  Obviously, the PSI does recommend a 
retained jurisdiction, but we’re bound by our recommendation for 
time and probation. 
 
 This case involves some very serious allegations, a very 
disturbing set of facts.  However, I think something that the State 
had taken into consideration was this was a first criminal conviction 
of any kind. 
 
 So, with that being said, I think given the nature of the 
offense that the defendant has pled guilty to and has taken 
accountability for, the felony injury to a child, I think that there 
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should be some significant jail time imposed without the potential 
for work release or even treatment release, if that was appropriate.  
I think somewhere between six months is appropriate given the 
severity of this offense and the fact that the PSI does recommend a 
rider.  I think taking that into account, I think a longer period of 
incarceration would certainly be appropriate. 
 
 This has obviously affected [A.M.] and her family and caused 
significant damage to them, so I think that some punishment is 
certainly appropriate. 
  
 I also think that in a case like this, we have to consider 
deterrence to the public, as well as to the defendant in this case, 
and so I think a seven-year sentence, a heftier sentence, would 
certainly be appropriate. 
 
 Normally, given lack of criminal history, we would probably 
recommend something lower, but I think given the nature of this 
particular offense, that would be a more appropriate sentence for 
deterrence, as well as placing the defendant on a longer period of 
supervised probation.  I think that would be beneficial in order to 
ensure that we don’t have other law violations and that the public is 
protected. 
 
(Sent. Tr., p.12, L.17 – p.14, L.3.) 
 Elizondo argues that the above comments by the prosecutor at sentencing 
were not “reasonably consistent” with the “promised recommendation of a lenient 
sentence of probation and local jail time[,]” “effectively disavowed the 
recommendation and advocated a harsher sentence[,]” and “breached the plea 
agreement by failing to fulfill its side of the bargain.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  
Elizondo’s arguments fail.   
 A prosecutor is entitled to make a “vigorous argument” in support of her 
sentencing request.  See, e.g., State v. Stocks, 153 Idaho 171, 175, 280 P.3d 
198, 202 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 168, 206 P.3d 
867, 874 (Ct. App. 2009).  Absent some basis for finding the prosecutor’s 
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argument was inconsistent with the agreed-upon recommendation, 
enthusiastically recommending the sentence authorized by the plea agreement 
does not constitute a breach.  Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 165, 206 P.3d at 871.   
Like the defendant in Halbesleben, supra, Elizondo relies on State v. 
Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 92 P.3d 549 (Ct. App. 2004), State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 
299, 303, 77 P.3d 988, 992 (Ct. App. 2003), State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 102 
P.3d 380 (Ct. App. 2004), and State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305 
(1995), to support his claim that the prosecutor in this case breached the plea 
agreement.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-10.)  As explained by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in Halbesleben, however, the cases are distinguishable because: 
In each of the cases cited above, the prosecutor acknowledged the 
recommendation required by the plea agreement but argued 
various other reasons why the district court should not accept the 
recommendation and, instead, impose a more severe sentence.  
Or, in the case of Lankford, the prosecutor presented additional 
aggravating evidence which, at a sentencing for first degree 
murder, only served to favor imposition of the death penalty or fixed 
life.  This was entirely inconsistent with the state’s agreement to 
recommend an indeterminate term of life imprisonment.  In the 
present case, the prosecutor made no allusion to a more severe 
recommendation contained in the PSI nor gave any personal 
opinion that Halbesleben’s crimes merited a greater punishment 
than what was recommended.  The prosecutor’s vigorous argument 
did not undermine the sentencing recommendation but, rather, 
buttressed it against any argument from defense counsel that 
Halbesleben merited even lesser sentences based on mitigating 
factors.  Therefore, the prosecutor did not impliedly disavow the 
sentencing recommendation through her vigorous argument of the 
facts of Halbesleben’s crimes and, thus, did not breach the plea 
agreement. 
 
Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 166-68, 206 P.3d at 872-874. 
Elizondo’s reliance on Daubs, Wills, Jones, and Lankford is misplaced.  
None of those cases even hints that it is possible to undermine a 
 8 
 
recommendation, and thus breach a plea agreement, merely by talking about the 
facts of the case or by drawing logical inferences therefrom.  The prosecutor in 
this case did not present any argument to the district court that was inconsistent 
with the recommendation for local jail and probation.  The prosecutor’s argument 
was directed at convincing the court that Elizondo should have to serve at least 
six months in local jail and be given an underlying prison term that would deter 
him from further criminality while on probation.  The prosecutor’s comments were 
well within the terms and spirit of the plea agreement.  Elizondo’s more specific 
contentions do not show otherwise.    
 First, the prosecutor’s reference to the PSI’s recommendation of a 
retained jurisdiction was not an attempt to have the court order the same.  (See 
Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-9.)  The prosecutor stated, “I think somewhere between 
six months is appropriate given the severity of this offense and the fact that the 
PSI does recommend a rider.  I think taking that into account, I think a longer 
period of incarceration would certainly be appropriate.”  (Sent. Tr., p.13, Ls.10-
14.)  The prosecutor’s comment about a rider – normally six months in duration – 
was simply a way to argue that Elizondo should receive at least that amount of 
local jail time.     
Second, the prosecutor’s comments that Elizondo’s crime involved a 
“serious allegation” and “a very disturbing set of facts” was an understated way of 
describing the overall incident set forth in the PSI, not an attempt to undercut the 
plea agreement.  (See Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  In fact, the prosecutor made no 
specific mention of Elizondo ordering A.M. to insert a small vibrator into her 
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vagina and telling her that he would take it to work and test it to see if she had 
had sex.  (See PSI, p.3.)  Also, Elizondo’s reported conduct, including his getting 
on top of A.M. and choking her while he held her hands above her head, was 
obviously a serious and disturbing allegation.  The prosecutor’s short-hand 
descriptions of Elizondo’s conduct were factually supported by the PSI and not 
inflammatory. 
Third, Elizondo takes issue with the prosecutor saying that his criminal 
conduct “obviously affected [A.M.] and her family and caused significant damage 
to them, so I think that some punishment is certainly appropriate.”  (Sent. Tr., 
p.13, Ls.15-17; Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  Elizondo argues that “the prosecutor drew 
the district court’s attention to the nature of the crime and the victim impact 
statements, even though the facts were highly disputed . . . .”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.9.)  Contrary to Elizondo’s apparent contention, it was not inappropriate for the 
prosecutor to summarize the impact his criminal conduct reportedly had on A.M. 
and her family.  See Idaho Const. art. I, § 22(6); I.C. § 19-5306(1); see also State 
v. Guerrero, 130 Idaho 311, 312, 940 P.2d 419, 420 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
right of a crime victim to address the court at the offender’s sentencing hearing is 
guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code).  Moreover, the 
prosecutor could hardly have done more to soften the description of the impacts 
Elizondo’s crime had and the appropriate punishment – “obviously affected,” 
“significant damage,” and “some punishment” did not signal that the judge should 
go beyond the prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation. 
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Fourth, Elizondo asserts that the plea agreement called for leniency by the 
state.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-10.)  However, the “leniency” was built into the 
plea agreement itself by limiting the state’s recommendation to local jail and 
probation – in contrast to the ten-year statutory maximum sentence for felony 
injury to a child.  See I.C. § 18-1501(1).  The prosecutor’s call for a “heftier” 
seven-year sentence was in regard to the underlying sentence “that would be a 
more appropriate sentence for deterrence, as well as placing the defendant on a 
longer period of supervised probation.”  (Sent. Tr., p.13, L.18 – p.14, L.3.)  
Plainly, the prosecutor was adhering to the agreement to recommend local jail 
and probation, with the seven-year underlying sentence to serve as incentive (or 
“deterrence”) for Elizondo to be successful on probation.   
Nothing in the prosecutor’s statements in this case was inconsistent with 
the agreement to recommend local jail and probation, nor did the prosecutor 
implicitly disavow the recommendation she made.  Indeed, although the 
prosecutor had the ability to recommend up to one year of local jail time, she did 
not.  Her recommendation was for at least six months jail (using the six month 
retained jurisdiction period as a guide) and probation – clearly within the terms of 
the plea agreement.  Elizondo’s claim to the contrary fails.   
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II. 
 
Elizondo Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Ordering An Underlying Sentence Of Five Years With Two Years Fixed And 
Placing Him In The Retained Jurisdiction Program 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Elizondo contends the district court abused its sentencing discretion 
“when it imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, upon 
[him], following his Alford[1] plea to felony injury to a child.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.10 (capitalization modified).)  Elizondo contends that “the district court 
should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment or probation in light 
of the mitigating factors.”2  (Id., p.12.)  Elizondo’s argument fails. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”  
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and 
citations omitted).  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its 
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  Id. 
  
                                            
1  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  
 
2  According to the Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository, on October 30, 2015, 
the district court placed Elizondo on probation for two years.  See Case Number 
Result Page for Kootenai Co. Case No. CR-2015-0001690 at 
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseNumberResults.do.  To the extent 
Elizondo contends he should have been initially sentenced to probation, that 
argument is now moot. 
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C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
“When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make 
an independent examination of the record, having regard to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.”  
Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 (quotations and citation omitted).  A 
review of the record demonstrates that Elizondo’s sentence is not excessive.  
Elizondo has failed to establish otherwise. 
The four objectives of sentencing are well-established.  They are “(1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution.”  State v. 
Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319-320, 144 P.3d 23, 24-25 (2006) (quotations and 
citations omitted).  “A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be 
sufficient.”  State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003) 
(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App. 
1991)).  State v. Ozuna, 155 Idaho 697, 705, 316 P.3d 109, 117 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(“The primary consideration is, and presumptively always will be, the good order 
and protection of society. All other factors are, and must be, subservient to that 
end.”). 
The appellate court presumes that the sentencing court is able to 
ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and 
material which is presented to it during the sentencing process.  State v. Pierce, 
100 Idaho 57, 58, 593 P.2d 392, 393 (1979); State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 
854 P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Bundy, 122 Idaho 111, 831 P.2d 953 (Ct. 
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App. 1992); State v. Holmes, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App. 1983).  The 
broad spectrum of information a court may consider at sentencing includes a 
defendant’s past criminal history and, with due caution, “the existence of [a] 
defendant’s alleged criminal activity for which no charges have been filed, or 
where charges have been dismissed.”  State v. Wickel, 126 Idaho 578, 581, 887 
P.2d 1085, 1088 (Ct. App. 1994).   
In imposing sentence the district court said: 
 I have reviewed the information that has been presented.  I 
have reviewed the presentence investigation report.  . . .  
 
As I see it, I see two options, one of an underlying sentence 
and probation and the other being that of – which would include a 
jail sentence, a local jail sentence, and the other being a retained 
jurisdiction. 
 
In reviewing the presentence investigation report, I note that 
Mr. Mora Elizondo had an aggregate LSI score of 17, which places 
him in the moderate risk category.[3]  “No treatment is 
recommended.  No additional mental health assessment is 
necessary.  His emotional behavioral conditions appear to be 
stable.” 
 
I am concerned about the potential risk and the risk factors 
as it relates to this particular offense.  Although he entered an 
Alford plea, the allegation of this specific count stated that he did 
willfully inflict upon a child under the age of 18, to wit: under the age 
of 16 years, unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering . . . . 
 
In this case, I am going to impose an underlying sentence in 
light of his – the fact that he has no prior criminal history of two 
years fixed, three years indeterminate, not to exceed five years.  I 
do think for the protection of society, it would be appropriate to 
have further review of him while in custody, and to do that, I am 
going to retain jurisdiction and recommend the Retained 
Jurisdiction Program, which is often referred to as the standard 
Retained Jurisdiction Program.  
 
                                            
3  “LSI score” is the assessed potential for recidivism.  (PSI, pp.12-13.) 
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(Sent. Tr., p.19, L.11 – p.20, L.20.)  After considering the relevant sentencing 
objectives, Elizondo’s lack of criminal history, and the PSI, the district court 
rightly determined that an underlying five-year sentence with two years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction, for felony injury to a child was appropriate.    
 Elizondo first “asserts that the district court abused its discretion at 
sentencing by imposing a sentence based on his incorrect understanding of the 
charged conduct.  The district court stated at sentencing: 
Although he entered into an Alford plea, the allegation of this 
specific count stated that he did willfully inflict upon a child under 
the age of 18, to wit:  under the age of 16 years, unjustifiable 
physical pain or mental suffering, to wit:  choking her by placing his 
hands around her neck while he was on top of her, all of which is 
contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statute. 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.11 (citing Sent. Tr., p.20, Ls.5-11) (emphasis in Appellant’s 
Brief).)  Immediately after making the above comments, the district court 
sentenced Elizondo to five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  
(Sent. Tr., p.20, Ls.12-20.)   
 The district court clearly misspoke when it described the conduct to which 
Elizondo pled guilty.  Count III of the original Information charged Elizondo with 
felony injury to child by “choking [A.M.] by placing his hands around her neck 
while he was on top of her[.]”  (R., pp.36-38.)  Elizondo did not plead guilty to that 
specific charge of felony injury to child.  Instead, pursuant to the plea agreement, 
Elizondo entered an Alford plea of guilty to the Amended Information’s charge of 
felony injury to child predicated on his “having sexual contact with [A.M.]”  (R., 
pp.42-43.)  To the extent the district court believed Elizondo pled guilty to a 
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different act (i.e., “choking”) underlying the felony injury to child charge than the 
act actually alleged (i.e., “sexual contact”), it erred.   
However, any such error was harmless because the conduct mis-cited by 
the district court as the “specific count” relevant to Elizondo’s sentencing for 
felony injury to child would have been properly considered as a dismissed count.  
As noted, a trial judge may consider a myriad of factors in imposing a sentence, 
including “criminal activity for which no charges have been filed, or where 
charges have been dismissed.” Wickel, 126 Idaho at 580-581, 887 P.2d at 1087-
1088; State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 409, 825 P.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1992); see also 
State v. Stewart, 122 Idaho 284, 286, 833 P.2d 917, 919 (Ct. App. 1992).  In 
short, the district court’s consideration of the dismissed “choking” count was 
proper.   
There is no reason to believe the district court would have given Elizondo 
a lighter sentence if it had correctly stated that the felony injury to child charge 
was based on “sexual conduct” instead of “choking.”  The PSI explained that 
during the January 13, 2015 incident, Elizondo had sexual contact with A.M. 
shortly before, during, and after he choked her.  (See Statement of Facts, pp.1-2, 
supra; PSI, p.3)  Inasmuch as the felony injury to child incident inextricably 
involved both choking and sexual contact, it made little, if any, difference which 
conduct was the named basis for the charge – the court was entitled to consider 
all of it for sentencing purposes.    
 Elizondo also asserts his sentence is excessive in light of the following 
alleged mitigating factors:  (1) he had no prior criminal history, (2) he allegedly 
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accepted responsibility for his crime, and (3) he would likely succeed if placed on 
probation, based on (a) his skills for jobs, (b) he has no substance abuse issues, 
and (c) his family relationship is good.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-13.)  Despite 
Elizondo’s arguments, the record supports the sentence imposed by the district 
court. 
 To demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion, the appellant must show that 
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  State v. 
Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001).  A sentence is reasonable, 
however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting 
society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or 
retribution.  Id.  The protection of society is, and must always be, the ultimate 
goal of any sentence.  State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 
(1956).  Accordingly, appellate courts must take into account “the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.”  
State v. Hopper, 119 Idaho 606, 608, 809 P.2d 467, 469 (1991); see also I.C. § 
19-2521.  
 Although the district court correctly noted that Elizondo did not have any 
prior criminal convictions, it based its sentencing decision on the PSI’s 
determination that Elizondo was a moderate risk to re-offend and the need to 
take reasonable steps to protect society from that risk.  (Sent. Tr., p.19, L.22 – 
p.20, L.15.)  Although Elizondo may have a supportive family, job skills, and no 
substance abuse issues, and, even assuming, arguendo, he accepted 
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responsibility for his crime,4 the court properly determined that, in order to protect 
society, “it would be appropriate to have further review of him while in custody[.]”  
(Id.)  Similarly, the presentence investigator recommended that the court retain 
jurisdiction.  (PSI, p.14.)   
 The district court in this case focused on Elizondo’s risk to re-offend and  
the overriding need to protect society.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, 
Elizondo has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s 
Judgment of Conviction and sentence. 
 DATED this 25th day of February, 2016. 
 
 
 
      __/s/ John C. McKinney_ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY  
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
                                            
4 The presentence investigator obviously did not conclude that Elizondo accepted 
responsibility for his crime, stating: “Mr. Elizondo was very vague in his version of 
the crime and his significant family information.  I did not believe Mr. Elizondo 
was truthful regarding his instant offense.  Mr. Elizondo indicated he has no idea 
why he is being convicted of a sex crime.”  (PSI, p.13.) 
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